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What	  we	  have	  proposed	  is	  that	  when	  a	  listener	  tries	  to	  understand	  what	  a	  speaker	  
means,	  the	  process	  he	  goes	  through	  can	  limit	  memory	  access	  to	  information	  that	  is	  
common	  ground	  between	  the	  speaker	  and	  his	  addressees.	  [...]	  ...the	  comprehension	  
process	  must	  keep	  track	  of	  common	  ground,	  and	  its	  performance	  will	  be	  optimal	  if	  
it	  limits	  its	  access	  to	  that	  common	  ground.	  Whether	  its	  design	  is	  actually	  optimal	  in	  
this	   respect	   is	  a	  question	   that	  can	  only	  be	  answered	  empirically.	   (Clark	  &	  Carlson,	  
1981,	  p.	  76-­‐77)	  
With	  this	  restricted	  access	  hypothesis,	  Clark	  and	  Carlson	  (1981)	  set	  the	  theoretical	  stage	  
for	   what	   is	   now	   an	   active	   area	   of	   research	   on	   perspective	   taking	   in	   spoken	   language	  
comprehension.	  Along	  with	  similar	  notions	  such	  as	  mutual	  knowledge	  and	  common	  knowledge	  
(e.g.,	   Lewis,	   1969),	   common	   ground—information	   that	   interlocutors	   share	   and	   believe	   they	  
share	   (Clark	   &	   Marshall,	   1981)—has	   played	   an	   critical	   role	   in	   theories	   of	   pragmatics.	   Such	  
constructs	   appear	   most	   prominently	   in	   Clark’s	   collaborative	   model,	   but	   are	   characteristic	   in	  
general	  of	  pragmatic	  approaches	  that	  invoke	  assumptions	  of	  cooperativity,	  assumptions	  that	  can	  
be	  traced	  back	  to	  Grice	  (1957).	  
Before	   the	   visual	   world	   paradigm	   became	   the	   dominant	   methodology	   for	   studying	  
conversational	   perspective	   taking,	   there	   were	   a	   number	   of	   investigations	   using	   traditional	  
psycholinguistic	  methodologies	  (for	  review,	  see	  Barr	  &	  Keysar,	  2006).	  A	  number	  of	  these	  studies	  
found	  evidence	  for	  the	  use	  of	  common	  ground	  during	  language	  interpretation	  (Clark,	  Schreuder,	  
&	   Buttrick,	   1983;	   Gerrig	   &	   Littman,	   1990;	   Greene,	   Gerrig,	   McKoon,	   &	   Ratcliff,	   1994;	   Gibbs,	  
Mueller,	  &	  Cox,	  1988),	  but	  their	  methodologies	  offered	  only	  limited	  insight.	  First,	  some	  of	  them	  
used	  third-­‐party	  judgments	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  written	  text	  (Gerrig	  &	  Littman,	  1990;	  Gibbs	  
et	   al.,	   1988),	   which	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   representative	   of	   what	   takes	   place	   when	   addressees	  
comprehend	   spoken	   language	   in	   conversational	   contexts.	   Second,	   some	   of	   them	   failed	   to	  
distinguish	   the	   use	   of	   information	   because	   it	  was	   jointly	   available	   from	   its	   use	   because	   of	   its	  
availability	  to	  the	  self,	  possibly	  leading	  to	  the	  underestimation	  of	  egocentric	  language	  processing	  
(see	  Keysar,	  1997	  for	  discussion).	  But	  the	  critical	  limitation	  of	  these	  studies	  is	  that	  they	  offered	  
almost	   no	   insight	   into	   the	   time-­‐course	   with	   which	   listeners	   integrate	   information	   about	   a	  
speaker’s	  perspective	  with	  the	  incoming	  speech.	  
Visual-­‐world	   eyetracking	   greatly	   expanded	   the	   potential	   for	   insight	   into	   how	   listeners	  
access	   and	   use	   common	   ground	   during	   situated	   language	   comprehension	   (for	   background	   on	  	  
visual-­‐world	   eyetracking,	   see	   Spivey	   and	   Huette,	   this	   volume;	   Pyykkönnen	   and	   Crocker,	   this	  
volume).	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   arguably	   in	   the	   study	   of	   situated	   language	   understanding	   that	   the	   key	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advantages	   of	   the	   visual	   world	   paradigm	   are	   most	   fully	   realized.	   First,	   visual	   world	   tasks	  
fundamentally	   involve	  reference,	  with	   listeners	   following	   instructions	   to	  manipulate	  objects	  or	  
pictures	  in	  a	  display.	  Referential	  ambiguity	  has	  long	  been	  a	  primary	  focus	  of	  pragmatic	  theories	  
(Clark	   &	   Carlson,	   1981;	   Clark	   &	  Marshall,	   1981),	   and	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   common	   sources	   of	  
misunderstanding	  in	  conversation	  (Schegloff,	  1987).	  Also,	  the	  use	  of	  spoken	  language	  to	  search	  
for	   referents	  within	   an	   environment	   can	  be	  quite	   naturally	  made	  part	   of	   a	   joint	   task,	   such	   as	  
working	  together	  to	  rearrange	  objects	  in	  a	  grid	  (Hanna,	  Tanenhaus,	  &	  Trueswell,	  2003;	  Nadig	  &	  
Sedivy,	   2002;	   Keysar,	   Barr,	   Balin,	   &	   Brauner,	   2000).	   Next,	   visual	   world	   eyetracking	   makes	   it	  
possible	  to	  observe	  the	  referential	  process	  as	  it	  unfolds	  in	  time,	  without	  the	  observation	  process	  
itself	   influencing	   comprehension,	   since	   it	   requires	   no	   deliberative	   judgments	   beyond	   those	  
involved	   in	   the	   interpretation	   process	   itself.	   Finally,	   the	   listener’s	   gaze	   location	   is	   sampled	   at	  
such	   a	   high	   rate	   (60–2000	   Hz)	   as	   to	   provide	   a	   nearly	   continuous	   profile	   of	   the	   entire	  
interpretation	  process,	  from	  anticipatory	  processing	  to	  high-­‐level	  decision	  processes.	  However,	  
with	  this	  new	  observational	  power	  comes	  substantive	  interpretive	  and	  statistical	  challenges	  that	  
are	  often	  underappreciated.	  
The	   study	   of	   conversational	   perspective	   taking	   in	   spoken	   language	   comprehension	   has	  
become	   a	   productive	   area	   of	   visual	   world	   research,	   with	   close	   to	   30	   published	   visual	   world	  
studies	   to	  date	   in	   just	  over	  a	  decade	  of	   research.	  From	  the	  earliest	   few	  studies	  with	   typically-­‐
developing	  adults,	  the	  area	  has	  expanded	  to	  investigate	  perspective	  taking	  in	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  
contexts,	  including:	  
• development	  (Epley,	  Morewedge,	  &	  Keysar,	  2004;	  Nadig	  &	  Sedivy,	  2002;	  Sobel,	  Sedivy,	  
Buchanan,	  &	  Hennessy,	  2011);	  
• scalar	  implicature	  (Grodner	  &	  Sedivy,	  2011;	  Heller,	  Grodner,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2008);	  
• the	  role	  of	  executive	  control	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009b;	  Lin,	  Keysar,	  &	  Epley,	  2010);	  
• effects	  of	  bilingualism	  (Rubio-­‐Fernández	  &	  Glucksberg,	  2011);	  
• effects	  of	  mood	  (Converse,	  Lin,	  Keysar,	  &	  Epley,	  2008);	  
• effects	  of	  familiarity	  between	  interlocutors	  (Savitsky,	  Keysar,	  Epley,	  Carter,	  &	  Swanson,	  
2011);	  
• joint	  action	  (Hanna	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2004);	  
• cross-­‐cultural	  differences	  (Wu	  &	  Keysar,	  2007);	  
• autism	  (Begeer,	  Malle,	  Nieuwland,	  &	  Keysar,	  2010);	  
• disfluency	  (Arnold,	  Hudson	  Kam,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2007);	  
• repeated	   reference	   and	   “conceptual	   pacts”	   (Barr	   &	   Keysar,	   2002;	   Brennan	   &	   Hanna,	  
2009;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009a;	  Horton	  &	  Slaten,	  2011;	  Kronmüller	  &	  Barr,	  2007;	  Metzing	  
&	  Brennan,	  2003)	  
My	  goal	  in	  the	  current	  chapter	  is	  not	  to	  review	  these	  studies;	  many	  of	  them	  have	  already	  
been	   reviewed	   elsewhere	   (Barr	   &	   Keysar,	   2006;	   Brennan	   &	   Hanna,	   2009;	   Brown-­‐Schmidt	   &	  
Hanna,	  2011).	   Instead,	  my	  aim	   is	   to	  address	  some	   long-­‐standing	  controversies	   in	   this	   research	  
area	   that,	   in	  my	   view,	   have	   impeded	   progress	   on	   important	   theoretical	   issues,	   and	   on	  which	  
there	   is	   a	   pressing	   need	   to	   arrive	   at	   some	   kind	   of	   consensus.	   Recently,	   several	   researchers	  
(Brennan	  &	  Hanna,	  2009;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Hanna,	  2011;	  see	  also	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  this	  volume)	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have	  taken	  note	  of	  the	  apparent	  divergence	  of	  findings	  in	  the	  area,	  with	  some	  studies	  appearing	  
to	   show	   stronger	   and	   earlier	   effects	   of	   common	   ground	   than	   others.	   They	   explain	   these	  
divergent	   findings	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  different	  paradigms	  various	   researchers	  have	  used	   to	   study	  
conversation	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  paradigms	  provide	  interlocutors	  with	  opportunities	  
to	  interactively	  establish	  common	  ground.	  They	  further	  suggest	  that	  studies	  showing	  the	  earliest	  
and	  strongest	  effects	  of	  common	  ground	  are	  those	  that	  allow	  common	  ground	  to	  be	  established	  
through	   live	   interaction.	   In	  contrast,	   they	  suggest	   that	   studies	   lacking	   live	   interaction—studies	  
which	  often	  use	  pre-­‐recorded	  materials	  with	  elaborate	  cover	  stories	  to	  convince	   listeners	  they	  
are	  listening	  to	  live	  speech—tend	  to	  show	  weaker	  effects	  of	  common	  ground.	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   argue	   against	   such	   attempt	   to	   reconcile	   findings	   based	   on	  
assumptions	   about	   interactivity.	  My	   argument	   has	   two	  main	   strands.	   First,	   although	   it	   seems	  
plausible	  that	  interaction	  gives	  stronger	  evidence	  for	  common	  ground,	  thus	  potentially	  yielding	  
stronger	  effects,	  the	  studies	  targeted	  as	  insufficiently	  interactive	  do	  indeed	  show	  reliable	  effects	  
of	  common	  ground;	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  show	  such	  effects	  on	  all	   levels	  of	  processing.	  So	  any	  
explanation	  that	  invokes	  interactivity	  would	  have	  to	  say	  why	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  this	  information	  
was	  used	  at	  some	  but	  not	  at	  all	  levels.	  Second—and	  more	  importantly—the	  explanation	  accepts	  
the	  divergence	  in	  published	  findings	  at	  face	  value.	  However,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  several	  key	  studies	  
shows	   that	   the	   divergences	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   reflect	   inconsistent	   practices	   of	   analysis	   and	  
interpretation	  applied	  to	  underlying	  body	  of	  data	  that	  is,	  in	  fact,	  surprisingly	  consistent.	  Had	  all	  
datasets	   been	   analyzed	   in	   the	   same	   way,	   researchers	   would	   have	   largely	   come	   to	   the	   same	  
conclusions.	  Until	  disagreements	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  theory	  and	  data	  are	  resolved,	  
it	  is	  premature	  to	  debate	  wider	  issues	  about	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  different	  research	  paradigms	  
for	   investigating	   common	   ground.	   If	   researchers	   not	   in	   agreement	   about	   what	   effects	   are	  
present	  in	  their	  data,	  and	  what	  such	  effects	  mean,	  attempts	  to	  debate	  any	  broader	  issues	  will	  be	  
largely	  futile.	  
To	  a	   large	  extent,	  how	  we	  analyze	  data	   is	   informed	  by	  our	  theoretical	  outlook—we	  look	  
for	  those	  things	  we	  expect	  to	  find,	  in	  the	  manner	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  them.	  To	  date,	  research	  on	  
perspective	  taking	  has	  focused	  on	  explanations	  pitched	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  language	  users,	  
asking	   if	   speakers	   or	   listeners	   use	   common	   ground	   in	   their	   processing	   of	   language.	   To	  
demonstrate	   such	   person-­‐level	   effects,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   show	   that	   common	   ground	   had	   an	  
effect	   on	   behavior	   (or	   brain	   activity).	   However,	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   appropriate	   level	   of	  
explanation	  is	  not	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  person,	  but	  the	  individual	  process.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  
asking	  questions	   like,	  Are	   listeners	  sensitive	  to	  context	   in	  understanding	  references?	  we	  should	  
be	  asking	  questions	  like,	  Does	  context	  influence	  lexical,	  semantic,	  syntactic,	  and/or	  phonological	  
processing;	  and	  if	  so,	  how?	  
This	   focus	   on	   process-­‐level	   explanations	   also	   calls	   for	   a	   different	   approach	   in	   how	   we	  
analyze	  and	  interpret	  data	  from	  visual-­‐world	  eyetracking	  studies.	  To	  adequately	  support	  claims	  
about	   effects	   of	   context	   on	   particular	   processes	   requires	   experimentally	   isolating	   those	  
processes	  in	  the	  data.	  I	  will	  present	  evidence	  that	  many	  of	  the	  diverging	  findings	  in	  the	  field	  are	  
the	  result	  of	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  handling	  of	  anticipatory	  baseline	  effects	  (ABEs)	   in	  the	  
analysis	   of	   visual	   world	   data.	   ABEs	   arise	   in	   perspective-­‐taking	   studies	   using	   visual	   occlusion	  
because	   listeners	  have	  access	   to	  constraining	   information	  about	  what	  speakers	  do	  and	  do	  not	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know	  well	  before	  they	  hear	  referential	  expressions.	  Listeners	  can	  make	  use	  of	  this	  constraining	  
information	  to	  reduce	  the	  set	  of	  referential	  alternatives	  before	  hearing	  speech.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  
undeniably	  shows	  that	  listeners	  are	  sensitive	  to	  common	  ground	  from	  the	  earliest	  moments	  of	  
processing.	  However,	  it	  is	  an	  independent	  question	  whether	  this	  information	  is	  also	  available	  to	  
individual	   processes	   within	   the	   comprehension	   system—it	   is	   entirely	   possible	   for	   individual	  
processes	  within	  a	  cognitive	  architecture	  to	  be	  unaffected	  by	   information	  actively	  represented	  
at	   other	   levels	   within	   the	   system	   (Fodor,	   1983;	   Sloman,	   1996).	   Thus,	   access	   does	   not	   imply	  
integration,	  since	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  information	  about	  the	  speaker’s	  knowledge	  is	  not	  used	  
later	  to	  modulate	  the	  processing	  of	  incoming	  speech.	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  between	  access	  and	  integration	  using	  appropriate	  statistical	  or	  
experimental	  controls.	  Fortunately,	  most	  studies	   in	  the	  area	   include	  the	  relevant	  experimental	  
controls,	   although	   such	   controls	   are	   sometimes	   not	   treated	   appropriately	   in	   the	   analysis.	   By	  
looking	  at	  the	  data	  in	  a	  way	  that	  includes	  such	  controls,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  several	  key	  studies	  show	  
similar	   temporal	   profiles	   of	   common	   ground	   use	   during	   the	   interpretive	   process:	   early	  
anticipatory	  effects,	  followed	  by	  bottom-­‐up	  effects	  of	  lexical	  processing	  that	  are	  not	  modulated	  
by	  common	  ground,	  followed	  (optionally)	  by	  late	  effects	  of	  common	  ground	  that	  may	  be	  post-­‐
lexical	   in	  nature.	   Furthermore,	   this	   temporal	  profile	   for	   common	  ground	   radically	  differs	   from	  
the	   profile	   of	   contextual	   effects	   induced	   by	   verb	   semantics.	   Together,	   these	   findings	   are	  
consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  lexical	  processes	  are	  encapsulated	  from	  common	  ground	  (and	  
possibly	   from	   other	   situational	   sources	   of	   constraint),	   but	   cannot	   be	   straightforwardly	  
accounted	  for	  by	  probabilistic	  constraint-­‐based	  approaches.	  
Visual	  world	  studies	  have	  quickly	  become	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  data	  not	  only	  in	  the	  study	  of	  
reference	   resolution	  and	  perspective	   taking,	  but	  also	   in	  many	  other	  areas	  of	   spoken	   language	  
processing.	   The	   controversies	   that	   have	   emerged	   within	   this	   particular	   area	   of	   language	  
processing	  are	  symptomatic	  of	   the	  more	  general	  absence	  of	  clear	  standards	   for	   relating	  visual	  
world	  data	   to	  psycholinguistic	   theory.	  Thus,	   the	   lessons	   that	  can	  be	  drawn	  by	  considering	   this	  
area	  of	  research	  in	  depth	  are	  relevant	  to	  visual	  world	  researchers	  at	  large.	  
The	  key	  tests	  of	  perspective-­‐taking	  in	  spoken	  language	  comprehension	  have	  come	  in	  the	  
form	   of	   visual	   world	   studies	   using	   joint	   referential	   communication	   tasks,	   in	   which	   potential	  
referents	  are	  made	  to	  be	  either	  privileged	  (known	  only	  to	  the	  listener)	  or	  shared	  (known	  both	  to	  
the	   listener	   and	   speaker)	   by	   visual	   occlusion	   or	   by	   manipulating	   listeners’	   beliefs	   about	   the	  
speaker.	  In	  this	  review,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  studies	  using	  typically-­‐developing	  adult	  populations,	  and	  
that	  involve	  the	  interpretation	  of	  simple	  referential	  descriptions.	  After	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  area,	  
I	  will	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  the	  findings	  by	  scrutinizing	  data	  from	  three	  studies	  that	  have	  similar	  
experimental	  designs	  but	  that	  differ	  in	  social	  interactivity:	  Barr	  (2008b),	  Hanna	  et	  al.	  (2003),	  and	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2009b).	  Studies	  involving	  repeated	  reference	  and	  “conceptual	  pacts”	  (Brennan	  
&	  Clark,	  1996)	  are	  not	  considered	  here,	  as	   they	   involve	  additional	   theoretical	  and	   interpretive	  
issues	  relating	  to	  priming	  and	  memory	  (see	  Kronmüller	  and	  Barr,	  2015,	  for	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  and	  
review).	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Theoretical	  and	  Empirical	  Background	  
In	   recent	   discussions	   of	   perspective	   taking	   in	   spoken	   language	   comprehension,	   the	  
restricted	   access	   hypothesis	   of	   Clark	   and	   Carlson	   (1981)	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   serious	   contender.	   I	  
believe	   this	   reflects	   the	   progress	   in	   the	   area,	   rather	   than	   any	   intrinsic	   implausibility	   of	   the	  
hypothesis	   in	   itself.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	   from	  the	  quote	  with	  which	  we	  began	   this	   chapter,	  Clark	  
and	  Carlson	  made	  principled	   theoretical	  claims	   that	  a	   language	  processor	   that	   limited	   itself	   to	  
information	   in	   common	   ground	   would	   be	   maximally	   efficient.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   scope	   of	  
processing	   that	   would	   be	   restricted	   in	   such	   a	   way	   was	   left	   vague;	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   it	   is	  
intended	   to	   apply	   all	   the	  way	   down	   to	   low-­‐level	   phonological	   and	   lexical	   processing.	   But	   it	   is	  
beyond	   dispute	   that	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   Clark	   and	   colleagues	   intended	   the	   analysis	   to	   apply	   to	  
high-­‐level	   interpretive	   processes,	   such	   as	   those	   involved	   in	   interpreting	   reference:	  
“Demonstrative	   reference	   is	  perhaps	   the	  prototype	  of	  expressions	   that	   cannot	  be	  understood	  
without	  appeal	  to	  context.	  But	  what	  context?	  If	  our	  proposal	  is	  correct,	  all	  the	  information	  the	  
listener	  should	  ever	  appeal	   to	   is	   the	  speaker’s	  and	  addressee’s	  common	  ground.”	   (Clark	  et	  al.,	  
1983,	   p.	   99).	   Importantly,	   it	   is	   with	   respect	   to	   these	   referential	   processes	   that	   the	   restricted	  
access	  model	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  disconfirmed.	  
An	   early	   study	   by	   Keysar	   et	   al.	   (2000)	   used	   a	   task	   in	   which	   listeners	   sat	   facing	   a	  
(confederate)	   speaker	  and	   followed	  his	   spoken	   instructions	   to	   rearrange	  objects	   in	  a	  grid	   that	  
stood	  vertically	  between	  them.	  Some	  of	  the	  slots	  of	  the	  grid	  were	  open	  from	  both	  sides	  so	  that	  
their	  contents	  could	  be	  mutually	  viewed	  (making	  the	  contents	  shared),	  while	  others	  were	  closed	  
off	   from	   the	   speaker’s	   side	   so	   that	   the	   listener,	   but	   not	   the	   speaker,	   could	   see	   the	   contents	  
(making	  the	  contents	  privileged).	  Some	  of	  the	  spoken	  instructions	  mentioned	  a	  shared	  “target”	  
object	   in	  a	  way	  that	  also	  matched	  a	  privileged	  “competitor”	  object.	  For	  example,	   for	  one	   item	  
the	  listener	  saw	  three	  candles	  of	  increasing	  size,	  the	  larger	  two	  of	  which	  were	  shared,	  and	  the	  
smallest	   of	   which	  was	   privileged.	   According	   to	   restricted	   search,	   when	   listeners	  were	   told	   to	  
“put	  the	  small	  candle	  next	  to	  the	  toothpaste,”	  they	  should	  only	  consider	  the	  smaller	  of	  the	  two	  
candles	  visible	  to	  the	  speaker,	  and	  not	  the	  privileged	  candle,	  because	  the	  speaker	  was	  ignorant	  
of	   the	   latter	  candle’s	  existence.	  Disconfirming	  this	  prediction,	   listeners	  attended	  far	  more	  to	  a	  
privileged	  small	  candle	  than	  to	  a	  privileged	  toy	  monkey,	  and	  showed	  severe	  delays	  in	  identifying	  
and	  selecting	  the	  target.	   In	   fact,	   listeners	  erroneously	  selected	  the	  privileged	  object	   instead	  of	  
the	  target	  about	  20%	  of	  the	  time,	  a	  rate	  that	  is	  surprisingly	  high,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  
restricted	  search.	  Other	  studies	  using	  a	  computerized	  version	  of	   the	  task	   in	  which	   listeners	  do	  
not	  receive	  feedback	  observe	  an	  even	  higher	  rate	  of	  errors,	  around	  40–50%	  of	  trials	  containing	  a	  
competitor	  (Apperly	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Later	   studies	   sought	   a	   more	   stringent	   test	   of	   restricted	   search	   by	   making	   it	   even	   less	  
plausible	  that	   the	  speaker	  might	  know	  about	  the	  contents	  of	  occluded	  squares,	  and	  by	  having	  
the	  privileged	  competitor	  visually	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  listener	  (Keysar,	  Lin,	  &	  Barr,	  2003).	  In	  one	  
experiment,	  listeners	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  grid	  containing	  only	  shared	  objects	  and	  given	  a	  box	  
with	  objects	   that	   they	  were	  supposed	  to	  “hide”	   from	  the	  speaker	   in	   the	  privileged	  squares.	   In	  
this	   way,	   there	   could	   be	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	   speaker	   was	   unaware	   of	   the	   contents	   of	   the	  
occluded	  spaces.	  Furthermore,	  one	  of	  these	  objects	  (the	  privileged	  competitor)	  was	  additionally	  
to	  be	  placed	  inside	  of	  a	  bag	  so	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  visible	  to	  the	  listener,	  such	  that	  looking	  at	  it	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could	   not	   be	   interpreted	   in	   terms	   of	   low	   level	   visual	   interference.	   The	   basic	   findings	   were	  
replicated,	  with	  longer	  gazes	  on	  privileged	  competitors	  than	  to	  noncompetitors,	  severe	  delays	  in	  
identifying	   and	   selecting	   the	   target,	   and	   a	   high	   error	   rate	   (again,	   around	   20%).	   A	   second	  
experiment	  went	  even	   further	  by	  comparing	   the	  standard	  condition	   in	  which	   the	  speaker	  was	  
presumed	  to	  be	  ignorant	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  occluded	  squares	  to	  one	  in	  which	  listeners	  were	  led	  
to	  believe	   that	   the	  speaker	  had	  a	   false	  belief	  about	   the	  contents	  of	   the	  square	  containing	   the	  
privileged	   competitor	   (or	   noncompetitor);	   for	   example,	   believing	   that	   it	   was	   a	   toy	   truck	  
(noncompetitor)	  when	   it	  was	  actually	  a	  small	  candle.	   In	  spite	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  should	  have	  
increased	   the	   salience	   of	   common	   ground,	   there	   was	   no	   evidence	   that	   listeners	   were	   less	  
egocentric	  in	  this	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  standard	  ignorance	  condition.	  
These	  studies,	  in	  addition	  to	  further	  studies	  using	  the	  same	  paradigm	  (Epley	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  
Lin	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   were	   presented	   as	   evidence	   against	   restricted	   search	   and	   in	   support	   of	   an	  
anchoring-­‐and-­‐adjustment	   model	   of	   perspective	   taking	   known	   as	   perspective	   adjustment.	  
According	   to	   perspective	   adjustment,	   comprehension	   processes	   are	   initially	   “anchored”	   in	  
information	  available	   to	   the	   self.	   Listeners	   can	  optionally	  use	   common	  ground	   to	  adjust	   away	  
from	   this	   anchor	   point,	   but	   this	   adjustment	   step	   is	   optional,	   and	   requires	   sufficient	   time	   and	  
processing	   resources.	   Thus,	   comprehension	   will	   be	   egocentrically	   biased	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  
listeners	  fail	  to	  adjust	  away	  from	  their	  own	  perspective.	  
While	   these	   initial	   studies	   provided	   clear	   evidence	   against	   restricted	   search,	   and	  
documented	  an	  alarming	  degree	  of	  egocentrism	  in	  spoken	  language	  comprehension,	  they	  had	  a	  
number	  of	   limitations	   that	   subsequent	   studies	   sought	   to	  address.	   First,	   Keysar	   and	   colleagues	  
provided	  only	  minimal	  time-­‐course	  information,	  such	  as	  first	  and	  final	  fixation	  times.	  These	  are	  
only	  crude	  measures	  of	  online	  processing,	  and	  may	  not	  be	  as	  sensitive	  as	  analyses	  that	  test	  for	  
effects	  across	  various	  time	  windows.	  
A	   further	   criticism	  was	   that	   the	   competitors	   in	   privileged	   ground	  were	   always	   a	   better	  
match	   to	   the	   semantics	  of	   the	   target	  description	   than	   the	   target	   itself	   (Nadig	  &	  Sedivy,	  2002;	  
Hanna	  et	  al.,	  2003);	   for	   instance,	   the	  privileged	  small	  candle	  was	  even	  smaller	   than	  the	  target	  
small	  candle.	  The	  original	  rationale	  for	  this	  feature	  was	  that	  it	  provided	  a	  distinct	  interpretation	  
in	   privileged	   ground;	   otherwise,	   if	   the	   privileged	   competitor	   was	   an	   equally	   good	   fit	   to	   the	  
description	  as	  the	  target,	  then	  listeners	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  use	  common	  ground	  to	  resolve	  the	  
ambiguity.	  It	  could	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  this	  feature	  leads	  to	  an	  overestimation	  of	  listener	  
egocentrism.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  when	  the	   target	  and	  competitor	  are	  equalized	   for	   their	   fit	   to	  
the	  referring	  expression,	  egocentric	  behavior	  is	  still	  observed:	  in	  one	  such	  study,	  the	  presence	  of	  
a	  competitor	  caused	  65%	  of	  listeners	  to	  ask	  for	  clarification	  (which	  candle?)	  at	  least	  once	  during	  
the	   experiment,	   even	   though	   there	   was	   only	   one	   possible	   referent	   in	   common	   ground	   (this	  
result	  did	  not	  hold	  for	  Asian	  participants;	  see	  Wu	  &	  Keysar,	  2007	  and	  Wu,	  Barr,	  Gann,	  &	  Keysar,	  
2013	  for	  additional	  discussion).	  
A	  more	  serious	  criticism	  was	  that	  these	  early	  efforts	  did	  not	  provide	  definitive	  support	  for	  
the	   perspective-­‐adjustment	   view,	   because	   they	   lacked	   a	   critical	   control	   (Hanna	   et	   al.,	   2003;	  
Nadig	  &	   Sedivy,	   2002).	   The	   analyses	   always	   compared	   a	   privileged	   competitor	   to	   a	   privileged	  
noncompetitor.	  While	  such	  a	  comparison	  is	  sufficient	  to	  test	  the	  restricted	  search	  hypothesis,	  it	  
is	   insufficient	   to	   support	   perspective	   adjustment	   as	   an	   alternative.	   Perspective	   adjustment	  
VISUAL-­‐WORLD	  STUDIES	  OF	  PERSPECTIVE	  TAKING	   7	  
assumes	  that	  listeners	  are	  “egocentric	  first”,	  but	  Keysar,	  Barr	  and	  colleagues	  only	  demonstrated	  
that	   privileged	   competitors	   were	   fixated	   more	   that	   privileged	   noncompetitors.	   Showing	   that	  
listeners	   were	   initially	   egocentric	   would	   have	   required	   demonstrating	   that	   privileged	  
competitors	  were	  fixated	  just	  as	  much	  as	  competitors	  in	  common	  ground,	  but	  the	  studies	  lacked	  
this	   condition.	   Thus,	   data	   from	   these	   studies	   are	   consistent	   not	   only	   with	   “egocentric	   first”	  
models,	   but	   also	   with	   models	   which	   assume	   that	   common	   ground	   exerts	   an	   immediate	   but	  
partial	  (rather	  than	  absolute)	  effect	  on	  referential	  processing.	  
Partial,	   immediate	   effects	   of	   common	   ground	   could	   be	   explained	   by	   probabilistic	  
constraint-­‐based	   models	   (PCBMs).	   The	   PCBM	   approach	   is	   thoroughly	   interactive	   and	  
nonmodular,	   and	   assumes	   that	   the	   different	   sources	   of	   constraint	   available	   to	   the	  
comprehension	  system,	  including	  common	  ground,	  is	  weighted	  and	  interactively	  combined	  from	  
the	   earliest	   moments	   of	   comprehension	   (MacDonald,	   Pearlmutter,	   &	   Seidenberg,	   1994;	  
Tanenhaus,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  &	  Hanna,	  2000).	  Importantly,	  there	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  no	  limitation	  
on	   the	   interaction	   between	   different	   levels	   of	   processing:	   information	   at	   very	   high	   levels	   of	  
processing	   (such	   as	   the	   systems	   tracking	   mutual	   knowledge)	   can,	   in	   principle,	   constrain	   the	  
operation	  of	   the	   lowest	   levels	   of	   processing	   (e.g.,	   phonological	   processing	   and	   lexical	   access).	  
The	  extent	  of	  this	  constraint	  depends	  not	  on	  the	  type	  of	  information	  but	  only	  on	  how	  heavily	  it	  
is	  weighted	  (i.e.,	  its	  salience	  and	  reliability).	  In	  this	  respect,	  PCBMs	  are	  similar	  in	  spirit	  (and	  often	  
functionally	   equivalent)	   to	   Bayesian	   models,	   which	   mathematically	   specify	   the	   optimal	  
combination	  of	  information	  in	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  (Jurafsky,	  1996).	  
PCBMs	  assume	  gradient	  effects	  of	  common	  ground,	  and	  thus	  predict	  that	  less	  competition	  
should	   be	   observed	   from	   a	   competitor	   in	   privileged	   ground	   than	   in	   common	   ground.	   Such	  
gradient	  effects	  would	  falsify	  the	  “egocentric	  first”	  prediction	  of	  perspective	  adjustment.	  To	  test	  
this,	  Hanna	  et	  al.	  (2003),	  varied	  whether	  the	  critical	  alternative	  was	  privileged	  or	  shared.	  In	  the	  
study,	   pairs	   were	   visually	   separated	   by	   a	   divider,	   and	   a	   (confederate)	   director	   instructed	   a	  
listener	   to	   place	   geometric	   shapes	   in	   an	   array	   to	   match	   the	   pattern	   viewed	   by	   the	   director.	  
Instead	   of	   visual	   occlusion,	   common	   ground	   was	   established	   through	   a	   grounding	   process	   in	  
which	   the	   director	   and	   participant	   talked	   about	  which	   shapes	   they	   had	   in	   common.	   At	   some	  
point,	  the	  director	  gave	  a	  critical	  instruction	  describing	  a	  target	  red	  triangle,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
critical	  alternative	  that	  was	  either	  a	  competitor	  (another	  red	  triangle)	  or	  noncompetitor	  (a	  green	  
triangle),	  and	  that	  was	  either	  privileged	  or	  shared.	  Consistent	  with	  PCBMs,	  listeners	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  gaze	  at	  a	  shared	  target	  than	  at	  a	  privileged	  competitor,	  and	  this	  difference	  was	  present	  
from	   the	   earliest	   moments	   of	   comprehension.	   Similar	   findings	   were	   reported	   by	   Nadig	   and	  
Sedivy	  (2002)	  in	  a	  study	  involving	  five-­‐	  and	  six-­‐	  year-­‐old	  children.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  
disconfirm	  the	  “egocentric	  first”	  prediction	  of	  the	  perspective-­‐adjustment	  view.	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt	   (2009b)	   found	   additional	   evidence	   for	   early	   effects	   of	   common	   ground.	  
Listeners	   answered	   a	   speaker’s	   questions	   about	   privileged	   objects	   (see	   also	   Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  
Gunlogson,	   &	   Tanenhaus,	   2008).	   The	   questions	   included	   ambiguous	   nouns	   that	   referenced	  
certain	  shared	   landmark	  objects,	  adjacent	   to	  which	  these	  privileged	  objects	  were	   located.	  The	  
ambiguous	  nouns	  were	  disambiguated	  by	  a	  following	  subordinate	  phrase:	  for	  example,	  listeners	  
might	  hear	  What’s	  above	  the	  cow	  that’s	  wearing	  shoes?	   in	  a	  context	  with	  two	  cartoon	  cows,	  a	  
“target”	   landmark	   cow	  wearing	   shoes	   and	  a	   “competitor”	   landmark	   cow	  wearing	   glasses.	   The	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question	   was	   whether	   listeners	   could,	   prior	   to	   the	   disambiguating	   word	   (e.g.,	   shoes),	   use	  
common	  ground	   to	   identify	   the	   target	   landmark	   and	   associated	  privileged	   target.	   There	  were	  
two	  critical	  manipulations,	  the	  first	  of	  which,	  “mention”,	  was	  whether	  the	  speaker	  had	  already	  
sought	   information	   about	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   privileged	   competitor	   located	   adjacent	   to	   the	  
competitor	   landmark	   (e.g.,	   the	   cow	   wearing	   glasses),	   or	   had	   instead	   asked	   about	   a	   control	  
object.	   In	  the	  former	  case	  (the	  “competitor-­‐mentioned”	  condition),	  when	  speakers	   later	  asked	  
“What’s	  above	  the	  cow...”	  listeners	  could	  use	  common	  ground	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  speaker	  must	  be	  
asking	   about	   the	   target	   cow,	   since	   she	   already	   knew	   what	   was	   above	   the	   competitor	   cow.	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt	   also	   introduced	   a	   second	   manipulation,	   “grounding”,	   crossed	   with	   the	   first,	  
which	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  speaker	  gave	  evidence	  of	  actually	  having	  properly	  understood	  the	  
listener’s	  reply.	   If	   listeners	  use	  common	  ground,	  they	  should	  show	  the	  earliest	  disambiguation	  
effect	  when	  a	  competitor	  was	  mentioned	  and	  successfully	  grounded,	  since	  this	  is	  the	  case	  where	  
the	   evidence	  was	   strongest	   that	   the	   speaker	   already	   knew	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   privileged	   item	  
that	  was	  next	  to	  the	  competitor	  landmark.	  
In	   her	   analysis,	   Brown-­‐Schmidt	   considered	   three	   consecutive	   400	  ms	   bins	   starting	   from	  
the	   onset	   of	   the	   noun	   (e.g.,	   cow),	   the	   first	   two	   of	   which	   would	   capture	   pre-­‐disambiguation	  
effects,	   and	   the	   third	   of	   which	   would	   capture	   post-­‐disambiguation	   effects.	   The	   analysis	  
suggested	   that	   listeners	   gazed	   at	   the	   target	   landmark	   and	   adjacent	   privileged	   target	   earlier	  
when	   the	   competitor	   landmark	   had	   been	  mentioned,	   and	   did	   so	   prior	   to	   the	   disambiguating	  
word.	   However,	   this	   effect	   only	   reached	   significance	   when	   the	   grounding	   of	   the	   privileged	  
competitor	  had	  been	  successful,	  suggesting	  that	   listeners	  used	  common	  ground	  to	  resolve	  the	  
reference.	  
Reconciling	  the	  findings	  
The	   above	   selective	   review	   of	   key	   studies	   on	   perspective	   taking	   in	   spoken	   language	  
comprehension	   reveals	   clear	   progress,	   but	   the	   field	   is	   far	   from	   reaching	   agreement	   on	   the	  
nature	   or	   timing	   of	   partner-­‐specific	   effects.	   The	   main	   points	   of	   agreement	   are	   that	   (1)	  
comprehension	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   common	   ground,	   but	   shows	   egocentric	   effects	   and	   (2)	  
common	  ground	  can	  be	  accessed	  early,	  and	  not	  just	  as	  part	  of	  a	  post-­‐comprehension	  stage,	  as	  
suggested	   by	   the	   perspective-­‐adjustment	   model.	   These	   findings	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   PCBMs.	  
However,	   although	   these	   studies	   have	   shown	  early	  access	   to	   common	   ground,	   they	   have	   not	  
gone	  further	  to	  show	  that	  this	  information	  was	  actually	   integrated	  with	  subsequent	  referential	  
processing.	  
Visual	   world	   studies	   of	   information	   integration	   seek	   to	   understand	   how	   contextual	  
evidence	  modulates	   the	   uptake	   of	   linguistic	   evidence.	   Each	   trial	   in	   a	   visual	  world	   study	   has	   a	  
particular	   temporal	   structure	   whose	   importance	   is	   often	   overlooked:	   namely,	   that	   the	  
presentation	   of	   the	   relevant	   contextual	   evidence	   temporally	   precedes	   that	   of	   the	   critical	  
linguistic	  evidence,	  often	  by	  a	  large	  interval.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  classic	  study	  of	  effects	  of	  visual	  
context	   on	   syntactic	   processing	   by	   Tanenhaus,	   Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	   Eberhard,	   and	   Sedivy	   (1995),	  
listeners	  had	  visual	  access	  to	  the	  information	  in	  the	  scene	  for	  some	  substantial	  amount	  of	  time	  
prior	  to	  hearing	  the	  critical,	  syntactically	  ambiguous	  portion	  of	  the	  expression.	  Or,	  in	  perspective	  
taking	   studies,	   listeners	   are	   given	   evidence	   about	   which	   referents	   are	   shared	   and	   which	   are	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privileged	  long	  before	  they	  hear	  a	  speaker	  make	  reference	  to	  any	  target	  object.	  Of	  course,	  such	  
a	   time	   lag	   is	   necessary,	   given	   that	   it	   is	   only	   possible	   to	   test	   whether	   people	   make	   use	   of	  
potentially	  constraining	  contextual	  information	  if	  they	  are	  given	  sufficient	  time	  to	  attend	  to	  and	  
process	  that	  information.	  However,	  prior	  availability	  of	  context	  can	  also	  produce	  differences	  in	  
gaze	  probabilities	  before	   the	  onset	  of	   the	   referring	  expression,	  and	   such	  anticipatory	  baseline	  
effects	  (ABEs)	  can	  cloud	  the	  interpretation	  of	  effects	  present	  during	  the	  acoustic	  lifetime	  of	  the	  
referring	  expression	  (Barr,	  2008a,	  2008b;	  Barr,	  Gann,	  &	  Pierce,	  2010).	  
ABEs	   are	   especially	   likely	   to	   arise	   in	   studies	   of	   perspective	   taking,	   since	   the	   critical	  
contextual	  information	  about	  what	  is	  or	  is	  not	  in	  common	  ground	  (or	  who	  is	  going	  to	  speak	  next)	  
is	  nearly	  always	  available	  from	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  trial.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  first	  experiments,	  Keysar	  et	  al.	  
(2000)	  noted	  that	   in	  a	  five	  second	  window	  prior	  to	  speech	  onset,	   listeners	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  
gaze	  at	  shared	  than	  at	  privileged	  referents.	  Such	  a	  “head	  start”	  for	  the	  probability	  of	  gazing	  at	  
shared	  objects	  may	  persist	   into	  the	  critical	  referring	  expression	  itself.	  What	  is	   important	  about	  
this	  is	  that	  it	  reflects	  information	  that	  listeners	  access	  in	  anticipation	  of	  upcoming	  speech.	  At	  the	  
person	  level,	  observing	  that	  listeners	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  gaze	  at	  objects	  consistent	  with	  context	  
could	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  they	  are	  making	  predictions	  about	  what	  the	  speaker	  might	  refer	  to	  
next.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  early	  sensitivity	  to	  common	  ground—but	  only	  at	  the	  
person	  level.	  
Pitching	   explanations	   at	   the	   process	   level	   rather	   than	   at	   the	   person	   level	   opens	   up	   the	  
possibility	  of	  dissociations—some	  levels	  of	  processing	  may	  have	  access	  to	  information	  that	  is	  not	  
accessible	   at	   other	   levels	   (Fodor,	   1983;	   Sloman,	   1996).	   Indeed,	   the	   presence	   of	   dissociations	  
between	   access	   and	   integration	   can	   be	   quite	   informative	   about	   underlying	   cognitive	   and	  
neurological	   architecture.	   Such	   access-­‐integration	   dissociations	   are	   often	   seen	   in	   vision,	   for	  
example;	  knowing	  that	  the	  two	  lines	  in	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  illusion	  are	  actually	  of	  equal	  length	  (e.g.,	  
by	   measuring	   them	   using	   a	   ruler)	   does	   not	   keep	   us	   from	   experiencing	   them	   as	   if	   they	   are	  
different;	   although	   the	   equality	   is	   represented	   in	   our	   minds,	   our	   visual	   system	   behaves	   as	  
though	  it	  lacks	  access	  to	  it,	  a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  cognitive	  impenetrability	  (Fodor,	  1983).	  To	  
show	  that	  information	  was	  integrated	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  of	  processing,	  it	  is	  insufficient	  to	  show	  
that	  it	  was	  attended	  to	  at	  the	  person	  level.	  
To	   test	   claims	   about	   whether	   contextual	   information	   is	   integrated	   into	   linguistic	  
processing	  at	  a	  particular	   level,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  statistically	  or	  experimental	   isolate	  effects	  at	  
that	   level	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   whether	   they	   are	   modulated	   by	   contextual	   information	   (Barr,	  
2008b).	  Showing	  that	  listeners	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  look	  at	  shared	  competitors	  than	  at	  privileged	  
competitors—as	   shown	  by	  Hanna	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   and	  Nadig	   and	   Sedivy	   (2002),	   among	   others—
indicates	  that	  common	  ground	  was	  used,	  but	   it	  doesn’t	   tell	  you	  how	   it	  was	  used.	   It	   is	  entirely	  
possible	  that	  listeners	  used	  common	  ground	  to	  anticipate	  what	  the	  speaker	  would	  refer	  to	  next,	  
but	  were	  unable	  to	  integrate	  that	  information	  during	  certain	  levels	  of	  referential	  processing.	  To	  
the	  extent	  that	  gazes	  to	  common	  ground	  objects	  are	  no	  higher	  during	  referential	  processing	  as	  
before	   that	   processing	   began	   casts	   doubt	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   common	   ground	   is	   actually	   being	  
used	  in	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  expression.	  
To	  test	  these	  ideas,	  Barr	  (2008b)	  conducted	  three	  perspective-­‐taking	  experiments	  using	  a	  
design	  similar	  to	  Hanna,	  Trueswell,	  and	  Tanenhaus,	  but	  examining	  temporary	  lexical	  ambiguities	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(buckle-­‐bucket)	   rather	   than	   full	   lexical	   ambiguities.	   Because	   the	   ambiguity	   is	   temporary,	  
listeners	  can	  ultimately	  resolve	  the	  ambiguity	  based	  on	  the	  phonology	  itself.	  Therefore,	  finding	  
evidence	  that	  common	  ground	  modulates	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  initial	  portion	  of	  the	  word	  in	  this	  
case	   would	   be	   strong	   evidence	   that	   it	   is	   accessed	   and	   used	   spontaneously	   during	   spoken	  
language	   comprehension.	   Listeners	   viewed	   computerized	   displays	   containing	   four	   objects	   and	  
heard	   a	   speaker	   (presumed	   to	   be	   speaking	   from	   another	   room	   and	   looking	   at	   a	   different	  
computer	  screen)	   instruct	  them	  to	  Click	  on	  the	  [target	  object].	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  target	  object	  
(e.g.,	  bucket),	  two	  of	  the	  remaining	  objects	  on	  the	  screen	  were	  also	  in	  common	  ground	  with	  the	  
speaker.	  The	  fourth,	  final	  object	  in	  each	  test	  display	  was	  a	  critical	  alternative	  that	  was	  either	  a	  
competitor	   (e.g.,	   buckle)	   or	   noncompetitor	   (e.g.,	   stepladder)	   and	   was	   furthermore	   either	  
privileged	  (i.e.,	  the	  listener	  believed	  that	  the	  speaker	  saw	  a	  blank	  box	  where	  the	  listener	  saw	  the	  
critical	   alternative)	   or	   shared	   (i.e.,	   the	   listener	   believed	   that	   the	   speaker	   also	   could	   see	   the	  
object).	  
The	  analysis	  was	  time-­‐aligned	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  noun	  identifying	  the	  target	  object	  (e.g.	  
“bucket”).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  listeners	  attend	  to	  common	  ground	  prior	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  noun,	  
during	   this	  same	   interval	   they	  should	  show	  a	   tendency	  to	  gaze	  at	   the	  critical	  alternative	  more	  
when	   it	   is	   shared	   than	   when	   it	   is	   privileged.	   If	   listeners	   are	   able	   to	   further	   integrate	   this	  
information	   into	   language	  processing,	   then	  the	  effect	  of	   lexical	  competition	   (e.g.,	  whether	   the	  
critical	  alternative	  is	  a	  buckle	  or	  a	  stepladder)	  should	  matter	  more	  when	  the	  critical	  alternative	  is	  
in	  common	  ground	  than	  when	  it	  is	  privileged.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  competition	  effect	  (the	  greater	  
tendency	   to	   gaze	   at	   the	   buckle	   than	   the	   stepladder)	   should	   be	   larger	   when	   the	   critical	  
alternative	  is	  in	  common	  ground,	  a	  pattern	  we	  will	  call	  anticipation	  plus	  integration.	  In	  contrast,	  
if	   lexical	   processes	   are	   encapsulated	   from	   this	   higher	   level	   information,	   then	   the	   competition	  
effect	   should	   appear	   no	   different	   in	   the	   two	   conditions,	   a	   pattern	   we	   will	   call	   anticipation	  
without	  integration.	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Predicted	  gaze	  behavior	  (left	  panel)	  and	  lexical	  competition	  effects	  (right	  panel)	  from	  
an	  “ideal	  listener”	  model	  under	  different	  levels	  of	  contextual	  constraint.	  
What	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   integration	   of	   common	   ground	   should	   lead	   to	  
attenuation	   of	   the	   lexical	   competition	   effect?	   To	   sharpen	   intuitions,	   let	   us	   consider	   language	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processing	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   an	   ideal	   listener	   who	   optimally	   integrates	   prior	  
expectations	  with	   incoming	   linguistic	   information.	  Using	  Bayes’	  theorem,	  we	  can	  formalize	  our	  
intuitions	  about	  how	  prior	  expectations	  might	  modulate	  the	  lexical	  competition	  effect.	  Note	  that	  
lexical	   competition	   is	   defined	   here	   as	   the	   difference	   in	   probability	   of	   gazing	   at	   the	   critical	  
alternative	  when	  it	  is	  a	  lexical	  competitor	  (e.g.,	  buckle)	  versus	  a	  noncompetitor	  (e.g.,	  stepladder)	  
when	  processing	  the	  target	  word	  (e.g.,	  bucket).	  Figure	  1	  presents	  hypothetical	  data	  for	  a	  fixed	  
evidence	  function	  under	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  prior	  expectations	  (.40,	  .25,	  and	  .10).	  All	  of	  the	  
functions	  were	  derived	  by	  applying	  Bayes’	  theorem	  to	  the	  same	  evidence	  under	  different	  priors.	  
When	   the	   listener	   believes	   that	   the	   critical	   alternative	   is	   a	   highly	   plausible	   referent—for	  
instance,	  with	  a	  prior	  probability	  of	  .40—there	  is	  a	  large	  competition	  effect	  (right	  panel).	  As	  the	  
critical	  alternative	  becomes	  less	  plausible,	  the	  competition	  effect	  becomes	  smaller;	  compare	  the	  
effects	  for	   .10	  and	  .40	  in	  the	  right	  panel.	  This	   is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  evidence	  function	  being	  
multiplied	  by	  different	  priors,	  as	  Bayes’	  Theorem	  stipulates.	   (Note	  that	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  
article,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  claims	  about	  the	  size	  of	  the	  competition	  effect	  on	  the	  proportional	  
scale,	  not	  the	  log	  odds	  scale.)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Overall	  results	  from	  Barr	  (2008),	  Experiment	  1	  (B08-­‐1);	  Hanna,	  Tanenhaus,	  &	  Trueswell	  
(2003),	  Experiment	  1	  (HT&T03-­‐1),	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2009)	  (BS09).	  Panel	  (a)	  shows	  the	  results	  
broken	  down	  by	  condition;	  panel	  (b)	  shows	  the	  competition	  effect	  by	  common	  ground	  status.	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In	  Barr’s	  first	  experiment	  (Figure	  2,	  top	  panel)	  common	  ground	  had	  a	  strong,	  statistically	  reliable	  
effect	   on	   listeners’	   prior	   expectation	   about	  what	   the	   speaker	  would	   refer	   to.	   Listeners	   gazed	  
more	  at	   the	  critical	  alternative	  when	   it	  was	   in	  common	  ground	  with	   the	   listener	   than	  when	   it	  
was	  privileged	  (with	  prior	  probabilities	  of	  approximately	  .20	  versus	  .05,	  respectively,	  from	  0–200	  
ms	  after	  speech	  onset,	  which	   is	  before	   language	  driven	  effects	  can	  appear	  assuming	  a	  200	  ms	  
overhead	  for	  saccadic	  programming).	  But	  despite	  a	  strong	  difference	  in	  prior	  expectation,	  there	  
was	   little	  evidence	   for	  any	  attenuation	  whatsoever	  of	   the	   competition	  effect	   in	   the	  privileged	  
condition	  (top	  row,	  right	  panel	  of	  the	  figure).	  This	  result,	  which	  suggests	  that	   lexical	  processes	  
are	  cognitively	  impenetrable	  with	  respect	  to	  common	  ground,	  was	  replicated	  in	  two	  additional	  
experiments.	  
The	   second	   experiment	   contrasted	   listeners’	   ability	   to	   integrate	   common	   ground	   with	  
their	   ability	   to	   integrate	   information	   from	   a	   preceding	   verb.	   Based	   on	   previous	   results	   from	  
Dahan	  and	  Tanenhaus	  (2004),	   it	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  verb-­‐based	  constraint	  would	   induce	  an	  
anticipation-­‐plus-­‐integration	   pattern,	   reflecting	   the	   penetrability	   of	   lexical	   processes	   to	   prior	  
linguistic	   context,	   while	   the	   constraint	   from	   common	   ground	   would	   yield	   an	   anticipation-­‐
without-­‐integration	   pattern,	   suggesting	   cognitive	   impenetrability.	   One	   group	   of	   participants	  
were	  in	  the	  common	  ground	  condition,	  and	  completed	  an	  experiment	  identical	  to	  Experiment	  1.	  
For	  a	  second	  group,	   the	  common	  ground	  manipulation	  was	  replaced	  with	  manipulation	  of	   the	  
verb	  preceding	  the	  critical	  noun.	  Half	  of	  the	  utterances	  given	  to	  this	  latter	  group	  began	  with	  the	  
verb	  click	  (e.g.,	  “click	  on	  the	  bucket”),	  which	   is	  unconstraining	   inasmuch	  as	   it	  could	  potentially	  
apply	  to	  any	  picture	  in	  the	  display.	  This	  unconstraining-­‐verb	  condition	  played	  a	  role	  analogous	  to	  
the	  shared	  condition	  for	  the	  common	  ground	  group	  (in	  fact,	  it	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  condition).	  In	  
the	  other	  half	  of	  the	  sentences	  presented	  to	  this	  second	  group,	  the	  verb	  click	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  
constraining	   verb	   that	   accepted	   the	   target	   as	   a	   potential	   direct	   object,	   but	   not	   the	   critical	  
alternative.	  For	  example,	  the	  verb	  empty	  in	  empty	  the	  bucket	  could	  apply	  only	  to	  the	  bucket,	  but	  
not	  to	  the	  stepladder	  or	  buckle.	  This	  constraining-­‐verb	  condition	  plays	  a	  role	  analogous	  to	  the	  
privileged	  ground	  condition	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  because	  as	  in	  that	  condition,	  well	  before	  the	  onset	  
of	  the	  noun,	  the	  contextual	  information	  already	  favors	  the	  target	  over	  the	  critical	  alternative.	  
Figure	  3.	  Effects	  of	  verb	  constraint	  on	  lexical	  competition,	  Experiment	  2	  of	  Barr	  (2008).	  
VISUAL-­‐WORLD	  STUDIES	  OF	  PERSPECTIVE	  TAKING	   13	  
The	   listeners	   in	   the	   common	   ground	   condition	   showed	   the	   same	   anticipation-­‐without-­‐
integration	   pattern	   seen	   in	   the	   first	   experiment.	   In	   contrast,	   listeners	   in	   the	   verb-­‐based	  
constraint	   group	   showed	   a	   very	   different	   pattern.	   Like	   the	   common	   ground	   group,	   the	   prior	  
contextual	   constraint	   exerted	   a	   strong	   effect	   on	   the	   prior	   likelihood	   of	   gazing	   at	   the	   critical	  
alternative.	  When	  the	  verb	  was	  one	  for	  which	  the	  critical	  alternative	  would	  be	  implausible	  as	  a	  
direct	  object	  (e.g.,	  the	  verb	  empty	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  buckle	  or	  a	  stepladder),	  listeners	  had	  a	  much	  
lower	  prior	  expectation	  that	  the	  critical	  alternative	  would	  be	  mentioned	  (about	  .05	  versus	  .15	  in	  
the	   condition	  where	   the	   verb	  was	   not	   constraining;	   see	   Figure	   3,	   left	   panel).	   This	   immediate	  
constraining	  effect	  of	  verbs	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  observed	  in	  Altmann	  &	  Kamide,	  1999	  and	  Dahan	  &	  
Tanenhaus,	  2004.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  strong	  anticipatory	  effect	  was	  present	  suggests	  that	  the	  verb	  
had	  been	  processed	  in	  time	  to	  influence	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  following	  referential	  expression.	  
But	  unlike	  for	  the	  common	  ground	  condition,	  there	  was	  strong	  evidence	  for	  attenuated	  lexical	  
competition	  in	  the	  condition	  with	  the	  lower	  prior	  (Figure	  3,	  right	  panel).	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  ideal	  listener	  model,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  critical	  alternative	  was	  a	  competitor	  mattered	  
less	  when	  the	  critical	  alternative	  was	  an	  implausible	  object	  of	  the	  verb.	  
The	  anticipatory	  effects	  of	   common	  ground,	  which	  were	  seen	  across	   three	   independent	  
experiments,	   supports	   the	   claims	   of	   Hanna	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   and	   Nadig	   and	   Sedivy	   (2002)	   that	  
listeners	   are	   sensitive	   to	   common	   ground	   from	   the	   earliest	  moments	   of	   processing,	   and	   thus	  
also	  reject	  the	  “egocentric	  first”	  account	  put	  forward	  by	  Keysar,	  Barr	  and	  colleagues.	  However,	  
looking	  at	  the	  data	  from	  a	  process	  level	  suggests	  that	  the	  egocentrism	  that	  is	  observed	  across	  all	  
of	   these	   studies	  may	  not	   reflect	   partial	   use	  of	   common	  ground,	   but	  may	  be	   the	   result	   of	   the	  
failure	  to	   integrate	  common	  ground	   into	   lexical	  processing,	  despite	  a	  strong	  prior	  expectation.	  
This	  might	  imply	  that	  lexical	  processes	  are	  encapsulated	  from	  common	  ground	  information,	  and	  
perhaps	   other	   kinds	   of	   situational	   information	   as	   well.	   The	   results	   from	   the	   verb-­‐constraint	  
condition	  provide	  an	  important	  contrast,	   inasmuch	  as	  they	  show	  that	   lexical	  processes	  are	  not	  
fully	   encapsulated	   from	  all	   contextual	   information.	   Indeed,	   verb	   semantics	   have	   very	   strongly	  
constraining	  effects	  on	  processing.	  It	  is	  an	  important	  question	  for	  future	  research	  to	  characterize	  
the	  source	  of	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  contextual	  constraint.	  
Advocates	  of	  PCBMs	  have	  argued	  against	  these	  findings	  on	  both	  theoretical	  and	  statistical	  
grounds.	  On	  the	  theoretical	  side,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  Hanna	  (2011)	  cite	  the	  lack	  of	  interactivity	  
in	  Barr’s	  experiments.	  To	  be	  sure,	  although	   listeners	  were	  actually	  hearing	  recorded	  materials,	  
two	   of	   three	   of	   the	   experiments	   employed	   elaborate	   cover	   stories	   to	   convince	   listeners	   that	  
they	  were	   listening	  to	  speakers	  who	  spoke	  to	  them	  live	  from	  another	  room.	  However,	  Brown-­‐
Schmidt	  and	  Hanna	  (2011)	  believe	  this	  is	  insufficient	  for	  establishing	  common	  ground:	  
...according	  to	  classic	  accounts,	  common	  ground	  forms	  as	  individuals	  collaboratively	  
establish	   what	   information	   is	   jointly	   known	   through	   an	   interactive	   grounding	  
process	  (Brennan	  &	  Clark,	  1996).	  In	  each	  of	  the	  studies	  that	  have	  shown	  significant	  
effects	  of	  common	  ground	  in	  on-­‐line	  interpretation,	  participants	  interacted	  with	  live	  
partners	  with	  whom	  they	  were	  able	  to	  collaboratively	   form	  common	  ground	  (e.g.,	  
Hanna,	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Nadig	  &	  Sedivy,	  2002;	  Heller,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  et	  al.,	  
2008;	   Brown-­‐Schmidt,	   2009a,b;	   Metzing	   &	   Brennan,	   2003).	   In	   contrast,	   in	   Barr’s	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(2008)	   experiments,	   participants	   never	   interacted	   with	   live	   partners,	   and	   never	  
engaged	  in	  grounding	  procedures.”	  (p.	  22).	  
Note	  that	  some	  of	  the	  interactive	  experiments	  cited	  by	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  Hanna	  created	  
opportunities	   for	   grounding,	   but	   did	   not	   require	   it	   as	   part	   of	   the	   procedure	   (Nadig	  &	   Sedivy,	  
2002;	  Heller	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  and	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  referents	  were	  actually	  grounded	  in	  every	  
case.	   This	   also	   ignores	   the	   fact	   that	   grounding	   is	   a	   procedure	   for	   dealing	   with	   cases	   where	  
common	   ground	   is	   uncertain,	   and	   Barr’s	   experiments	   used	   procedures	   where	   the	   common	  
ground	  was	  made	   clear	   through	   the	   structure	  of	   the	   “game”	  participants	  were	  playing.	  When	  
common	  ground	  is	  not	  uncertain,	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  (and	  in	  fact,	  odd)	  to	  first	  engage	  in	  grounding	  
(e.g.,	  akin	  to	  asking	  someone	  sitting	  at	  your	  dinner	  table,	  “Do	  you	  see	  the	  salt?”	  prior	  to	  asking	  
them	  to	  pass	  it	  to	  you.)	  
It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   listeners	   in	   Barr’s	   experiments	   clearly	   attended	   to	  
common	  ground:	   indeed,	   the	  odds	  of	  gazing	  at	  common	  ground	  referents	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  
the	   expression	  were	   three	   to	   four	   times	   higher	   than	   the	   odds	   of	   gazing	   at	   privileged	   ground	  
referents.	  Because	  the	  interactional	  affordances	  account	  assumes	  that	  grounding	  is	  necessary	  to	  
form	   common	   ground,	   it	   could	   best	   account	   for	   Barr’s	   results	   if	   there	   were	   null	   effects	   of	  
common	   ground	   altogether,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   how	   it	   would	   explain	   why	   effects	   of	   common	  
ground	  were	   very	   large	   for	   some	   processes	   (referential	   anticipation)	   but	   negligible	   for	   others	  
(lexical	  competition).	  
The	   second	   criticism	   leveled	   against	   Barr’s	   results	   is	   statistical	   in	   nature,	   and	   calls	   in	  
question	  the	  use	  of	  regression	  to	  partial	  out	  effects	  of	  common	  ground	  on	  anticipation	  versus	  
integration.	   This	   criticism	   first	   appeared	   in	   a	   conference	   presentation	   by	   Tanenhaus	   and	  
colleagues	  (Tanenhaus,	  Frank,	  Jaeger,	  Masharov,	  &	  Salverda,	  2008)	  and	  was	  further	  discussed	  by	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt	   and	   Hanna	   (2011)	   in	   a	   footnote.	   The	   approach	   in	   Barr	   (2008a)	   was	   to	  
parameterize	   a	   polynomial	   regression	   model	   so	   that	   baseline	   effects	   were	   captured	   in	   the	  
intercept	   term,	   with	   the	   time-­‐varying	   (e.g.,	   slope)	   parameters	   capturing	   integration	   effects.	  
Tanenhaus	   and	   colleagues	   acknowledged	   that	   anticipatory	   baseline	   effects	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	  
interpretation,	  but	  suggested	  that	  Barr’s	  approach	  may	  introduce	  statistical	  artifacts.	  They	  note	  
that	  the	  gaze-­‐state	  a	  listener	  is	  in	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  referring	  expression	  constrains	  possibilities	  
for	   subsequent	   gaze	   states,	   with	   a	   particular	   concern	   about	   cases	   where	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	  
referring	  expression,	  listeners	  are	  already	  looking	  at	  the	  referential	  alternative	  being	  analyzed.	  It	  
is	   difficult	   to	   go	   into	   detail	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   these	   arguments	   as	   they	   have	   not	   been	  
adequately	   expounded	   in	   the	   literature,	   with	   only	   a	   one	   page	   conference	   abstract	   publically	  
available.	  Given	  the	  scanty	  information,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  at	  all	  whether	  gaze-­‐state	  dependencies	  are	  
claimed	  to	  exist	  as	  an	  analytical	   fact	  or	  as	  an	  empirical	  possibility.	  A	  passing	  remark	   in	  Brown-­‐
Schmidt	  (2009b)	  suggests	  that	  she	  considers	  it	  an	  analytical	  fact	  having	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  
eye	  data,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “...one	  cannot	  make	  a	  saccade	  to	  what	  one	  is	  already	  
looking	  at”	  (p.	  896).	  The	  relevance	  of	  this	  tautological	  observation	  is	  unclear	  since	  the	  primary	  
events	  being	  analyzed	  are	  eye	  gazes,	  which	  extend	  over	  time,	  not	  discrete	  saccadic	  events.	  It	  is	  
indeed	   possible	   to	   continue	   or	   discontinue	   gazing	   at	  what	   one	   is	   already	   gazing	   at	   (see	   Barr,	  
Gann,	  &	  Pierce,	  2011	  for	  further	  discussion).	  Such	  “in	  principle”	  analytical	  concerns	  about	  gaze-­‐
state	  dependences	  seem	  ill-­‐founded.	  Still,	  it	  is	  also	  reasonable	  to	  view	  gaze-­‐state	  dependencies	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as	   an	   empirical	   possibility,	   in	   which	   the	   sequences	   of	   gazes	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   referring	  
expression	   somehow	   influences	   how	   the	   referential	   expression	   itself	   is	   processed.	   Frank,	  
Salverda,	   Jaeger,	   and	   Tanenhaus	   (2009)	   reported	   evidence	   for	   such	   dependencies,	   but	   their	  
results	  may	   have	   been	   artifacts	   due	   to	   regression	   toward	   the	  mean;	   ruling	   out	   this	   possiblity	  
would	   require	   a	   fuller	   evaluation	   of	   their	   methods	   than	   is	   possible	   from	   a	   single	   conference	  
poster	  presentation.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  premature	  to	  dismiss	  the	  statistical	  solution	  proposed	  by	  Barr	  
(2008a)	   until:	   (1)	   convincing	   empirical	   or	   theoretical	   arguments	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   gaze	   state	  
dependencies	   have	   been	   made	   in	   the	   scientific	   literature;	   (2)	   the	   logic	   of	   how	   such	  
dependencies	  might	   bias	   the	   proposed	   statistical	   solution	   is	   clearly	   articulated	   and	   validated;	  
and	   (3)	   the	   magnitude	   of	   any	   claimed	   biases	   have	   been	   measured	   and	   compared	   to	   the	  
potential	  biases	  of	  any	  alternative	  solutions.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  none	  of	  these	  conditions	  has	  
been	  met.	  
One	  thing	  that	  has	  been	   ignored	   in	  the	  debate	  over	  baseline	  effects	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	  
not	   necessary	   to	   control	   for	   baseline	   effects	   statistically;	   indeed,	   they	   can	   be	   controlled	  
experimentally	  by	  using	  appropriate	  control	  conditions.	   Indeed,	  such	  experimental	  control	  was	  
already	  built	   into	   the	  design	  of	  Barr	   (2008b).	   The	  analysis	   did	  not	  directly	   compare	  gaze	  on	  a	  
shared	  buckle	   to	  gaze	  on	  a	  privileged	  buckle,	  but	   instead	  compared	   the	  effect	  of	   competition	  
(competitor	   vs.	   noncompetitor)	   within	   the	   privileged	   condition	   (privileged	   buckle	   versus	  
privileged	  stepladder)	  to	  competition	  within	  the	  shared	  condition	  (shared	  buckle	  versus	  shared	  
stepladder).	  Note	  that	  within	  the	  privileged	  condition,	  there	  is	  no	  baseline	  effect:	  the	  privileged	  
noncompetitor	  starts	  off	  at	  the	  same	  probability	  as	  the	  privileged	  competitor.	  By	  the	  same	  logic,	  
there	   is	   no	   baseline	   difference	   between	   the	   shared	   competitor	   and	   shared	   noncompetitor.	  
Furthermore,	   it	   cannot	   be	   argued	   that	   because	   the	   shared	   competitor	   starts	   higher	   than	   the	  
privileged	  competitor,	  it	  has	  less	  room	  to	  go	  up,	  artificially	  dampening	  the	  competition	  effect	  for	  
shared	  referents.1	  This	  apparent	  “disadvantage”	  for	  the	  shared	  competitor	  is	  perfectly	  offset	  by	  
the	   “advantage”	   that	   the	   shared	   noncompetitor	   has	  more	   room	   to	   go	   down	   (thus	   potentially	  
enhancing	  the	  competition	  effect)	  than	  the	  privileged	  noncompetitor.	  
The	   top	   right	   panel	   of	   Figure	   2	   (labeled	   B08-­‐1b)	   compares	   these	   competition	   effects	  
(competitor	  minus	  noncompetitor	  for	  each	  of	  the	  shared	  and	  privileged	  conditions),	  controlling	  
for	   anticipatory	  baseline	  differences.	   This	   analysis	   very	   clearly	   shows	  no	  evidence	  whatsoever	  
for	  a	  larger	  competition	  effect	  in	  the	  common	  ground	  condition	  (if	  anything,	  the	  effect	  appears	  
larger	   in	   the	   privileged	   condition).	   Given	   that	   this	   evidence	   exploits	   experimental	   rather	   than	  
statistical	  control,	  arguments	  about	  “gaze-­‐state	  dependencies”	  do	  not	  apply.	  
Finally,	  the	  invocation	  of	  interactive	  grounding	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  different	  findings	  
is	   questionable	  because	   there	  may	  be	  no	  differences	   there	   to	   explain	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   given	  
that	   not	   all	   available	   studies	   distinguish	   access	   from	   integration.	   Still,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
qualitatively	   assess	   whether	   the	   findings	   are	   concordant	   by	   considering	   probability	   data	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Barr	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  evaluated	  the	  logic	  of	  this	  argument	  about	  conditions	  with	  higher	  baselines	  having	  less	  room	  to	  
go	   up	   and	   found	   it	   lacking.	   They	   showed	   that	   regardless	   of	   whether	   trials	   are	   on-­‐	   or	   off-­‐region	   at	   the	   onset	   of	  
referring	  expression,	  they	  have	  equal	  potential,	  in	  principle,	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  subsequent	  target	  probabilities.	  
Off-­‐region	  trials	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  target	  by	  becoming	  on	  region,	  and	  against	  it	  by	  staying	  off;	  on-­‐region	  trials	  vote	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  target	  by	  staying	  on	  region,	  and	  against	  it	  by	  becoming	  off.	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presented	  in	  the	  figures	  of	  Hanna	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2009b).	  The	  probability	  data	  
was	  extracted	  and	  reconstructed	  from	  the	  figures	  in	  these	  papers	  by	  a	  pixel	  mapping	  technique	  
using	  photo	  editing	  software	  (GIMP).	  
Hanna	   et	   al.	   (2003)	   used	   an	   identical	   2x2	   factorial	   design	   to	   Barr	   (2008b),	   in	   which	  
competition	   (competitor	   vs.	   noncompetitor)	   was	   crossed	   with	   common	   ground	   status	  
(privileged	  vs.	  shared).	  Although	  this	  design	  allows	  for	  the	  experimental	  control	  of	  anticipatory	  
effects,	  the	  authors’	  analyses	  did	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  this	  control.	  Instead,	  inferential	  statistics	  
were	  presented	   for	  data	   from	   just	  one	   cell	   of	   the	  design,	  where	   the	   critical	   alternative	  was	   a	  
privileged	  competitor.	  This	  analysis	  directly	  compared	  probability	  of	  gazing	  at	  the	  target	  (which	  
was	   in	   common	  ground)	   to	   the	  probability	  of	  gazing	  at	   the	  privileged	  competitor	   in	   this	   same	  
condition,	  over	  a	  200-­‐800	  ms	  window.	  However,	  the	  advantage	  they	  found	  for	  the	  shared	  target	  
could	  be	  explained	  entirely	  as	  the	  result	  of	  anticipatory	  baseline	  effect	  favoring	  the	  target.	  If	  we	  
consider	  data	  from	  the	  full	  design,	  would	  we	  see	  a	  smaller	  competition	  effect	  in	  the	  privileged	  
ground	  condition,	  as	  the	  ideal	  listener	  model	  predicts?	  And	  if	  so,	  at	  what	  point	  would	  the	  effect	  
appear?	  
Gaze	  probabilities	  to	  the	  critical	  alternative	  from	  Experiment	  1	  of	  Hanna	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  were	  
extracted	  from	  Figures	  2	  and	  3	  of	  their	  manuscript,	  and	  are	  given	  in	  the	  middle	  row	  of	  Figure	  2	  
of	   the	   current	   manuscript.	   Analyzing	   the	   data	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   as	   we	   just	   did	   for	   Barr’s	  
experiment,	   we	   find	   an	   anticipation-­‐without-­‐integration	   pattern	   (middle	   row,	   right	   panel).	  
Clearly,	   there	   is	  an	  overall	  competition	  effect	  starting	  at	  around	  250-­‐300	  ms,	  as	  evident	   in	  the	  
rise	  of	  the	  lines	  from	  zero	  in	  both	  the	  shared	  and	  privileged	  condition.	  However,	  the	  competition	  
effect	  in	  the	  privileged	  condition	  seems	  identical	  to	  the	  shared	  condition	  until	  around	  600	  ms	  at	  
which	  it	  begins	  to	  diverge.	  There	  is	  a	  simple	  reason	  why	  this	  divergence	  appears	  in	  Hanna	  et	  al.	  
but	  not	   in	  Barr’s	   experiments:	  Barr	  used	   lexical	   ambiguities	   that	  were	  quickly	   resolved	  by	   the	  
input	   (buckle-­‐bucket),	   whereas	   Hanna	   et	   al.	   used	   full	   ambiguities	   (e.g.,	   both	   target	   and	  
competitor	   were	   identical	   red	   triangles).	   Because	   the	   input	   never	   resolved	   the	   ambiguity,	  
listeners	  in	  the	  shared	  competitor	  condition	  would	  have	  to	  ask	  the	  speaker	  which	  referent	  she	  
intended;	   thus,	   the	   competition	   effect	   in	   this	   condition	   is	   long	   lasting.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   the	  
privileged	  competitor	  condition,	  listeners	  could	  spontaneously	  resolve	  the	  ambiguity	  by	  making	  
use	  of	  the	  information	  that	  the	  speaker	  was	  unaware	  of	  the	  privileged	  red	  triangle.	  The	  fact	  that	  
they	  did	  this	  late—well	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  competition	  effect—suggests	  that	  the	  effect	  could	  
be	   postlexical,	   and	   is	   thus	   consistent	   with	   the	   evidence	   presented	   in	   Barr	   (2008b)	   for	   the	  
encapsulation	  of	  lexical	  processing	  from	  common	  ground.	  
A	  similar	  approach	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  results	  from	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2009b).	  Following	  the	  
approach	   described	   by	   Tanenhaus	   et	   al.	   (2008),	   Brown-­‐Schmidt	   (2009b)	   removed	   all	   trials	  
starting	  with	  a	  gaze	  to	  either	  the	  target	  or	  competitor	  regions	  (nearly	  40%	  of	  all	  data).	  However,	  
Barr	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   showed	   that	   not	   only	   is	   such	   drastic	   data	   removal	   unnecessary,	   it	   actually	  
introduces	   bias	   due	   to	   regression	   toward	   the	  mean	   (and	   potentially	   selection	   biases	   as	  well).	  
Therefore,	   we	   consider	   the	   results	   for	   the	   full	   data	   that	   Brown-­‐Schmidt	   presented	   in	   the	  
appendix	   (Figure	  A1	  of	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	   2009b).	  Unlike	   the	  previous	  analyses,	  which	   looked	  at	  
competition	   effects,	   here	   we	   look	   at	   the	   effect	   of	   “mention”,	   that	   is,	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  
listener	   had	   already	   attempted	   to	   give	   the	   speaker	   information	   about	   the	   identity	   of	   the	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privileged	   item	   adjacent	   to	   the	   competitor	   landmark.	   Note	   that	   it	   is	   only	   in	   the	   “grounded”	  
condition	  that	   listeners	  should	  consider	  this	   information	  part	  of	  common	  ground,	  because	   it	   is	  
only	   in	   this	   condition	   that	   listeners	   had	   evidence	   that	   speakers	   actually	   registered	   the	  
information.	  
The	  raw	  data	  are	  plotted	  in	  the	  left	  panel	  of	  the	  bottom	  row	  of	  Figure	  2,	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
mention	   plotted	   in	   the	   right	   panel	   of	   the	   same	   row.	   One	   notable	   result	   is	   that	   even	   before	  
listeners	  processed	  the	   target	  word	   (e.g.,	  cow),	   there	  was	  already	  a	  quite	  substantial	  effect	  of	  
mention	  present	  in	  both	  the	  grounded	  and	  ungrounded	  condition.	  In	  fact,	  at	  0	  ms	  (the	  onset	  of	  
the	  word)	  the	  effect	  of	  mention	  already	   looks	  slightly	   larger	   in	  the	  grounded	  condition	  than	  in	  
the	  ungrounded	  condition.	  Thus,	  even	  before	  listener	  knew	  that	  the	  speaker	  would	  refer	  to	  the	  
cow,	   they	   were	   already	   paying	   attention	   to	   information	   in	   common	   ground.	   This	   apparent	  
anticipatory	  baseline	  effect	  is	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  that	  observed	  in	  Barr’s	  experiments.	  Note	  
additionally	   that	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   effects	   of	   mention	   for	   the	   grounded	   and	  
ungrounded	  conditions	  only	  really	  begins	  to	  exceed	  this	  baseline	  effect	  600-­‐800	  ms	  after	  word	  
onset;	   the	   lines	   seem	   to	   rise	   roughly	   in	   parallel	   up	   to	   this	   point.	   This	   overall	   pattern—an	  
apparent	   anticipatory	   effect	   of	   common	   ground,	   followed	   by	   apparent-­‐partner	   independent	  
processing,	  followed	  again	  by	  a	  late	  effect	  of	  common	  ground—is	  consistent	  with	  encapsulated	  
language	  processing	  during	  the	  ambiguous	  noun.	  
Different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  same	  underlying	  data	  pattern	  
In	  summary,	   literature	  reviews	  of	  visual	  world	  studies	  on	  perspective	  taking	  have	  largely	  
taken	  the	  diverging	  findings	  of	  the	  various	  studies	  at	  face	  value,	  and	  some	  have	  attributed	  these	  
apparently	   different	   findings	   to	   differences	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   paradigms	   used	   by	  
different	   labs	   afford	   collaborative	   interaction	   (Brennan	   &	   Hanna,	   2009;	   Brown-­‐Schmidt	   &	  
Hanna,	  2011;	  see	  also	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  this	  volume).	  Such	  authors	  suggest	  that	  those	  studies	  in	  
which	  common	  ground	  is	  established	  interactively	  are	  also	  those	  that	  show	  the	  strongest	  effects	  
of	   common	   ground.	   But	   this	   explanation	   seems	   implausible,	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   it	   leaves	  
unexplained	   why	   some	   noncollaborative	   studies	   show	   strong	   effects	   of	   common	   ground	   on	  
certain	   aspects	   of	   processing	   (i.e.,	   anticipatory	   baseline	   effects)	   but	   not	   on	   others	   (i.e.,	  
competition	   effects).	   Second,	   and	  more	   importantly,	   they	  make	   the	  mistake	  of	   assuming	   that	  
the	   divergent	   findings	   are	   real.	   However,	   when	   anticipatory	   effects	   of	   common	   ground	   are	  
controlled	   for,	   these	  studies	  show	  roughly	   the	  same	  evidence	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  encapsulation	  of	  
lexical	  processes	  from	  common	  ground,	  regardless	  of	  the	  collaborative	  potential	  afforded	  by	  the	  
paradigm.	  
This	  analysis	   reveals	   that	   the	   failure	   to	  appropriately	  distinguish	  access	   from	   integration	  
has	   led	  to	  the	  overestimation	  of	   listeners’	  abilities	  to	   integrate	  common	  ground	  with	  incoming	  
input.	  Whereas	   listeners	   seem	   to	  be	  able	   to	   integrate	   semantic	   information	   from	  a	  preceding	  
verb	  to	  a	  near	  optimal	  level,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  common	  ground.	  The	  results	  
generally	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   period	  early	   in	   the	  processing	  of	   referential	   expressions	   that	  
proceeds	   entirely	   autonomously	   from	   common	   ground,	   and	   possibly	   from	   other	   kinds	   of	  
situational	  information.	  But	  given	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  this	  claim,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pursue	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further	   studies	   corroborating	   the	   basic	   finding,	   as	   well	   as	   attempting	   to	   delimit	   the	   types	   of	  
contextual	  information	  that	  cannot	  be	  integrated.	  
The	   study	   of	   perspective	   taking	   in	   language	   processing	   is	   challenging	   on	   many	   levels.	  
Researchers	  often	  adopt	  conflicting	  definitions	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  perspective	  taking	  or	  common	  
ground,	   sometime	   conflating	  notions	  of	  mutual	   belief	  with	   shared	   information	  or	   information	  
that	   is	   merely	   associated	   with	   a	   speaker	   (see	   Keysar,	   1997	   and	   Lee,	   2001	   for	   discussion).	  
Theoretical	   disputes	   arise	   out	   of	   a	   failure	   to	   distinguish	   the	   use	   of	   speaker	   associated	  
information	   from	   the	   use	   of	  meta-­‐representational	   information	   about	   a	   speaker’s	   beliefs.	   For	  
instance,	   an	   ERP	   study	   has	   shown	   that	   stereotypical	   information	   associated	  with	   a	   particular	  
type	  of	  speaker	  influences	  lexical	  processing	  (van	  Berkum,	  van	  den	  Brink,	  Tesink,	  Kos,	  &	  Hagoort,	  
2008);	   e.g.,	   listeners	   experience	   a	   classic	   N400	   effect	   to	   the	   contextually	   inappropriate	   word	  
“tattoo”	  when	  hearing	  the	  sentence	  “I	  have	  a	  large	  tattoo	  on	  my	  back”	  spoken	  in	  an	  upper-­‐class	  
accent.	   But	   stereotypical	   information	   about	   a	   type	  of	   speaker	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   information	  
about	  a	  particular	  speaker’s	  beliefs	  and	  goals;	  the	  former	  type	  of	  information	  is	  representational	  
and	   contextually	   stable;	   the	   latter	   is	   meta-­‐representational	   and	   can	   be	   highly	   contextually	  
variable.	  Additionally,	  studying	  perspective	  taking	  or	  “mentalizing”	  more	  generally	  is	  challenging	  
because	  many	  things	  that	  look	  like	  genuine	  mentalizing	  can	  be	  produced	  by	  simpler	  mechanisms	  
that	  do	  not	   involve	  representations	  of	  another’s	  beliefs	   (for	  discussion,	  see	  Barr,	  2014;	  Heyes,	  
2014).	   It	   is	  also	  a	  problem	  that	   interlocutor	  behavior	   in	  highly	   interactive	  contexts	   is	  mutually	  
dependent	   (by	  definition),	  which	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  distinguish	  behaviors	   that	   reflect	  mutual	  
adjustments	   arising	   from	   feedback	   from	   truly	   individual	   cognitive	   adaptations	   undertaken	  
unilaterally	  and	  spontaneously	  (Barr,	  2014).	  
Finally,	  as	  noted	   in	   this	   review,	   research	  on	  perspective	   taking	   is	  challenging	  because	  of	  
the	  often	  complex	  nature	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  data	  and	   theory,	  which	  arises	   from	  the	  
rich	  nature	  of	  visual-­‐world	  eyetracking	  data.	  Despite	   this	  complexity,	   the	   fact	   that	   researchers	  
are	   asking	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   and	   nuanced	   questions	   about	   perspective	   taking	   is	   an	  
encouraging	  sign	  of	  progress.	  However,	  to	  progress	  further,	  the	  field	  needs	  to	  forge	  consensus	  
on	  basic	   issues	  of	   data	   analysis	   and	   interpretation.	   The	   approaches	   that	   researchers	   adopt	   to	  
data	   analysis	   in	   visual-­‐world	   perspective-­‐taking	   studies	   are	   currently	   far	   too	   eclectic,	  
unprincipled,	   and	   ad	  hoc.	  Unfortunately,	   this	   is	   probably	   also	   true	  of	   visual	  world	   research	   in	  
general.	  Statistical	  and	  experimental	  solutions	  have	  already	  been	  proposed	  in	  the	  peer-­‐reviewed	  
literature	  (Barr,	  2008a,b;	  Barr	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  but	  researchers	  often	  ignore	  these	  solutions	  without	  
adequate	   justification	   based	   on	   the	   suspicion	   that	   they	   are	   unsound.	  However,	   this	   suspicion	  
currently	  lacks	  a	  clear	  theoretical	  or	  empirical	  justification.	  Citing	  vague	  concerns	  about	  possible	  
“gaze	  state	  dependencies”	  should	  not	  give	  researchers	  carte	  blanche	  to	  ignore	  the	  interpretive	  
problems	   imposed	   by	   anticipatory	   baseline	   effects,	   nor	   to	   dismiss	   the	   solutions	   to	   these	  
problems	   that	   have	   already	   been	   proposed	   and	   evaluated.	   Resolving	   this	   debate	   should	   be	  
prioritized,	   as	   a	   basic	   consensus	   on	   analysis	   and	   interpretation	   is	   preliminary	   to	   any	   broader	  
theoretical	  debates	  about	   interactivity	  and	   language	  processing.	  Research	   in	   this	  area	   still	   has	  
great	  potential	  to	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	  language	  processing	  in	  real-­‐world	  settings,	  but	  
can	  only	  do	  so	  if	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  solid	  foundation	  of	  data	  analysis	  and	  interpretation.	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